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THE ADAPTATION OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
TO NEW USES *
A. K. R. Kiralfy*
The history of English law has until a few generations ago 
been the history of judge-made law. The law, and the judges, 
have been accused of undue conservatism and unwillingness to 
change. It is recognized that some freedom of movement has 
existed at the outer fringes of legal development, but the hard 
core of the law has been conceived of as fixed and unyielding. 
It is my present object to point out that this analysis is super­
ficial. It is not that the judges have been less willing to see the 
law progress than other members of society; it is rather that the 
very limited and, strictly speaking, unauthorized character of 
judicial legislation has imposed strict limitations on their activities. 
The one-way character of precedent has also been an obstacle to 
sudden reversals of legal development. In spite of these formid­
able bars the judges have succeeded in many cases in achieving 
legal reform by altering the character of well-established legal 
institutions from within, leaving them outwardly unchanged, so 
that their activities have escaped causing conspicuous scandal. 
This is simply one aspect of English life; where other societies 
undergo constant revolutionary change the English revolutionise 
the content while maintaining strict respect for the form, thus 
harmonising the tenacious conservatism and vocal radicalism 
which mark the national character. The present address is an 
attempt to show how this paradox has been realized in the field 
of legal change, and it will be clear to even the casual observer 
that the changes thus achieved have been deliberately worked out 
by the courts, though a typical reticence, perhaps a conspiracy of 
silence, has veiled its workings.
I should like to begin with a fairly familiar theme, the 
change in the character of the English Court of Chancery. In 
mediaeval times we find the Court of Common Pleas entrenched 
in the field of real property law. The Court of Chancery exercises
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a special jurisdiction over various royal claims connected with 
revenue and with the grant and revocation of charters. This 
Chancery Court begins in the fourteenth century to extend its 
activity to interfere with abuses of common law procedure, but 
solely in order to make the common law itself more effective, 
e.g. dealing with municipal officials who, for personal interest, 
were failing to execute procedural steps in civil litigation.1 In 
the next century the Chancery begins to develop equitable institu­
tions, but always against a background of common law. Since 
real property law dominated common law and formed the most 
lucrative legal practice it was natural that equitable interference 
became most marked in this area, and resulted, in a sense, in 
equity becoming the prisoner of the law of real property. For 
several centuries the Chancellors still consulted the common law 
judges where difficult points of real property law arose in the 
cases brought before them.2 However, as a result of the acknow­
ledged primacy of equity over conflicting rules of law, and owing 
to the general use of conveyancing based on the device of trusts, 
the Court of Chancery came to take over most of the work of 
the old Common Pleas. The Chancery Bar also came to specialise 
in the field of real property. The final result has been that ques­
tions of real property law in England now fall almost exclusively 
to the Chancery Division of the High Court, sometimes because 
of its competence in construing written documents, sometimes 
because of direct statutory authority, sometimes as a result of 
administrative allocation of work. The English “common lawyer” 
now professes ignorance of real property law and most practi­
tioners at the Bar avoid it. This is not true of the less specialised 
solicitor in England, who devotes much of his time to property 
matters. It is also untrue where the legal profession is undivided, 
as in Ontario, where there is also no longer a separate Chancery 
jurisdiction, and fusion of law and equity is much more advanced.
It is, of course, no accident that equity became caught in 
the trammels of the old land law. England was a feudal society 
and its law a feudal law. I feel that insufficient attention has 
been paid by legal and economic historians to the role which 
equity played as a solvent of feudalism, in addition to the well- 
known functions of the inflation of currency, reducing the value 
of feudal dues, and the Peasants’ Revolt. The old common law 
was agrarian, with concrete concepts like seisin and feoffment and 
specific remedies for the recovery of land. It was the law of a 
society of agricultural aristocracy which treasured the soil which
1 See Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., p. 154.
2 Ibid., p. 156.
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f  sustained it. Equity began its career as this society was in decline, 
and as commerce, industry, money, initiative and invention 
■  replaced land ownership as the leading principle of the economy. 
F  It can be no accident that equity deals with figures and balances, 
with notional conversion, with intent and not form, with con­
science rather than possession, with tracing of wealth in and out 
of various forms, and with such intangible ideas as trust funds 
and choses in action, creatures of the balance sheet and not the 
soil.3
The great equitable remedy of specific performance has under­
gone important changes without losing its identity. In mediaeval 
times petitions were made to the Chancellor to enforce agree­
ments because they were unenforceable at law. The Chancellor 
had no organized machinery for the enforcement of judgments, 
e.g. sheriffs and bailiffs, but he could summon the defendant or 
judgment debtor and ultimately imprison him. Hence, obviously 
following Continental models and canon law, he ordered defend­
ants to perform their obligations specifically, on pain of com­
mittal for contempt. As time went on, suitors began to petition 
in Chancery where they had a remedy in damages at common 
law but for some reason this remedy was inadequate. As these 
suits came to be accepted a new theory evolved, that the grant of 
specific performance was a privilege designed from the start to 
improve on the common law remedies, and all sorts of restrictions 
began to be imposed on its issue. The fact that it had once been 
the only remedy was lost to sight.4
The mortgage is an institution which has changed its char­
acter without losing its identity. It began as an emergency loan 
to meet a case of sudden illness or to ransom a capture from the 
Saracens or pirates, and was frowned on as an un-Christian 
exploitation of the needs of a neighbour. For centuries equity 
was vigilant to protect the borrower and allow him opportunities 
to recover his land. The profligacy of the upper classes in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to widespread use of such 
securities to raise spending money, and resulted in the ruination 
of once great families. In modem times, however, the mortgage 
has become a common and almost universal means of financing 
purchases. Many buyers would never own their own homes if they 
could not obtain the purchase price in advance from a mortgagee. 
Business men whose finances are quite healthy often prefer to 
pay low interest on mortgages and put their money to more profit-
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3 See, for example, Re Hallett (1880), 13 Ch. D. 696; Lingen v. Sowray 
(1711), 1 P. Wms. 172; 24 E.R. 343.
4 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., pp. 625 et seq.
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able purposes, while mortgage interest is also a useful tax deduc­
tion. The courts have been compelled to recognise this, and are 
far less prone to relieve the borrower from the consequences of 
his bargain.5
The trust has proved one of the most adaptable institutions 
of all time. At first, like the mortgage, it was an emergency device 
to provide safety for the legal title while the landowner was away 
during a war or other emergency, and in particular where the 
heir apparent was too young to manage the estates. Then it was 
much used for frauds on creditors or for evasion of the law 
prohibiting the acquisition of lands by the Church without royal 
licence.0 Gradually it assumed its modern form, a deliberate 
transfer of property to third-party management, fulfilling many 
of the purposes of institutions, curacies and tutorships under the 
Roman systems. The charitable trust has followed the familiar 
pattern of adaptation. It originated with a stress on public works, 
such as harbours and bridges, then turned into a noble work for 
education and religion, and, now in England, as the welfare 
state takes over most philanthropic functions, the charity has 
revived in the form of trusts for special “amenities” beyond 
actual welfare needs.7
Turning now to the common law, it will surprise no one that 
the most remarkable adaptations have occurred in the supposedly 
hidebound field of real property law. Though this area is one of 
natural conservatism over existing title, it is also one where the 
possibility of slow and careful planning has allowed experienced 
lawyers to turn their imagination to good account.
The change in the character of the settlement for successive 
interests, a typical common law institution, is notable. It was at 
first the feudal superior who, fearing that he might be burdened 
with an uncongenial or even disloyal vassal, limited the grant of 
land to the life of the immediate grantee, whom he knew and 
trusted. But as the grant of fee simple interests became general, 
with the slackening of the personal aspects of feudalism, land­
owners themselves seized on this idea of limited ownerships as 
a means of carving estates out of their own titles, in order to 
curb the supposed extravagance of their descendants and place 
the dead hand on the destinies of the living.8
5 Ontario statute law still restricts postponement of redemption to five 
years, but mortgages by corporate bodies are exceptions: R.S.O., 1960, 
c. 245, s. 16.
6 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., pp. 606, 609.
7 Report of the Nathan Committee (U.K. Cmd. Paper 8710), c. 2.
8 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., p. 529.
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The lease, so different, in theory at least, from the Continen­
tal contract of hire of land, has proved the most adaptable institu­
tion of all. The original conception of tenure was characteristic 
of the relation of feudal lord and freehold vassal, and had no 
application to mere contractual relationships.0 Yet, as the new 
contractual lease began to replace the older feudal freehold rela­
tion in the economic pattern of land use, the supposedly staid 
courts experienced no difficulty in applying it to such ideas as 
specific recovery of the land by the tenant, the remedy of distress, 
the rule of forfeiture for denying the landlord’s title, and the 
whole doctrine of real covenants— so different from the “classic” 
common law ideas of contract.10 Would a modern judge feel free 
to adapt the rules of law in such a cavalierly fashion? We know, 
too, that the lease began as an emergency device to raise money, 
as a type of mortgage without any entry on land, that it soon 
turned into the modem lease and that actual entry and possession 
became requirements.11 The despised lessee soon became envied 
because his remedies were more recent and therefore more liberal, 
and proud freeholders abandoned their own cumbrous and anti­
quated remedies in order to usurp the lessee’s actions, by using 
legal fictions of leases to fictitious lessees.12
In recent times the concept of “mutuality” has been employed 
by courts in order to provide some exceptions to hard rules. Thus 
the rule that an easement must be expressly reserved by the 
vendor has been relieved, in the case of drainage easements and 
easements of support to buildings, by holding that an implied 
reservation is the fair reverse of the coin to an implied grant.13 
The rule that the burden of positive covenants to repair will not 
run with land has also been undermined, in the case of sale of 
apartments in buildings, by holding that the tenant of the flat 
may only use the common spaces, such as stairways and drives, 
so long as he contributes to the repair funds as he contracted.14
Conveyancing exhibits many important, if gradual, changes. 
Thus the fine and recovery began as genuine litigation and were 
then adapted to collusive actions resulting in a kind of guaranteed 
title by judicial record.15 The lease of land was adapted to the 
functions of a sale by means of the two-stage procedure of lease
9 Ibid., p. 487.
10 Ibid., pp. 498-500.
11 Ibid., p. 499.
12 Ibid., p. 511.
13 Gale on Easements, 13th ed., pp. 87, 88.
14 Halsall v. Brizell, [1957] Ch. 169.
15 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., p. 533.
and release, in order to escape the embarrassing publicity which 
the Statute of Enrolments of 1536 attached to sales of land; the 
simple private lease for a year was followed by an equally private 
deed of release, the legislature in its wisdom having failed to take 
into account the rule that reversions might be so disposed of.1* 
The deed, so typical of land transfer in modem times, was 
originally a mere testimonial of an oral ritual of “feoffment with 
livery of seisin”. As feoffments with complicated conditions came 
to be used, the “charter of feoffment” or deed became a necessity 
to preserve the actual terms. Gradually it became the usual proof 
of title and feoffments were first made alternative and then abol­
ished altogether.17
In recent years there has been much controversy about the 
jury system. Thus England abolished the system of presentment 
by grand juries in 1933 but some Canadian provinces, including 
Ontario, still preserve it, though subject to the criticism that its 
role is rather mechanical. In early days in England the grand 
jury was a body of denunciants and very much an instrument of 
the Crown, but, owing to the rather peculiar political and religious 
conditions of the 17th and 18th centuries, at that time acquired 
the very different character of a buffer between Crown and subject, 
less liable to press for political prosecution than the Crown coun­
sel and less dependant on the royal favour than the judges. With 
the growth of responsible Parliamentary government the need for 
a buffer between the free citizen and the laws enacted by his 
freely chosen representatives disappeared, especially with the 
extension of the right to vote to all classes irrespective of wealth.
The system of preliminary enquiry which paralleled the 
grand jury in England and still does so in Ontario is another 
example of adaptation. At first its function was to deal with the 
award of bail and curb the avarice of extortionate sheriffs, but the 
magistrates so extended their activities that they conduct a 
preliminary trial of the strength of the prosecution case and 
consequently led to recent suggestions that they merely duplicate 
the trial on the merits.
The trial jury originated simply as a group of impartial 
witnesses in civil cases, who at first did not require to be unani­
mous, but turned into judges of fact and later were also used by 
a desperate court as a form of criminal trial since the trial by 
ordeal became unworkable as a result of the withdrawal of the 
Church’s cooperation in 1215. The fiction that the jury were a
16 Ibid., p. 521.
17 Ibid., pp. 520, 522.
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form of proof and not a judicial body led to many inconsistencies 
in the law, e.g. the rules of venue which require jurors to come 
from the place of the wrong or crime, in order to be knowledge­
able about it. Today we rationalize the rule and attribute it to 
the laudable aim of spreading the workload fairly among potential 
jurors, in particular to prevent the London jurymen doing all the 
work because lawyers may find it more convenient to have a case 
tried in London rather than in the English provinces, and corre­
spondingly with Toronto in Ontario.18 The idea that the jury were 
themselves the form of proof led to the omission on the records 
of trials of any account of the offering of evidence to the jury as 
judges of fact or of the addresses of counsel. It is correspondingly 
difficult to study the history of the law of evidence. When it is 
added that law reporters seldom troubled themselves with 
criminal cases and that trials of facts in civil cases seldom 
attracted them once the pleadings had been settled by the court, 
we can see how great a blow has been struck by this fiction at the 
orderly study of legal history. The idea that civil juries knew the 
tacts in advance led to the peculiar procedure of attaint by which 
an unpopular verdict could be treated as some kind of perjury.10 
The criminal juror escaped this treatment, but not on the rational 
ground that he was trying to decide on the evidence but on the 
equally grotesque fiction that he had been voluntarily chosen by 
the prisoner as a form of proof—that the prisoner had “put him­
self on his country”—and that (though the logic of this now 
escapes us) he could not then object to the results of the proof 
selected. We may compare this with the similar rule in wager 
of law in civil cases, that if any of the oath-helpers stumbled over 
the ritual the person “helped” stood “confessed” as in the wrong.
The important change from oral to written pleadings in 
superior courts was another development with devious origins. 
Holdsworth shows us how it was first used by men unable to 
afford counsel or where counsel refused to accept their statements 
as fact and would not “aver” them to the court.
The substantive criminal law has manifested several examples 
of changes in law by peculiar means. Thus we are having difficulty 
today in drafting a generally acceptable law of homicide, but 
this is the more understandable if we recollect that our common 
law did not start with a positive hierarchy of offences but with a 
general strict rule that killings were felony. If a killing were 
purely accidental it was necessary to sue for a free pardon; if
18 Ibid., p. 342.
19 Ibid., p. 248.
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it involved some measure of guilt such pardon would involve a 
fine or a period of waiting in prison. At one time the Crown was 
prone to excuse even what we should now call murder, if the 
subject was willing to serve in the royal forces or had done some 
service in the past. Parliament found it necessary, in order to 
protect the public, to curb the royal generosity and deny the 
right to pardon the most serious types of homicide. Hence our 
law was built up haphazardly from conditions of pardoning and 
not pardoning, and we have not been left by our forebears any 
really logical constructive principle.20
A crime which has wholly changed its content is blasphemy, 
which began as a weapon of the Church against dissent and has 
with time been changed into a form of prevention of public dis­
order, protecting all beliefs, even those inimical to the Established 
Church, from provocative, intemperate attack.21
Benefit of clergy was widely used to protect first offenders 
in former times. It began as a true means of protecting priests 
from the lay power but subjecting them to expulsion from the 
Church for the future. By allowing any man to “claim his clergy” 
by reciting a set passage of Scripture this institution became a 
general means of law reform. As a reaction, Parliament enacted 
that certain heinous offences should be “without benefit of clergy”.”  
Although the benefit has long since been abolished the “allocutus” 
after conviction, where the accused is asked if he can state any 
cause why he should not be sentenced, still lingers on to embarrass 
prisoners and judges.23
There are few subjects today on which lawyers are so 
divided as the subject of punishment—whether it is useful, and, 
if so, what forms it should take. Here again we suffer from the 
absence of any consistently developed legal historical background. 
At common law crimes were generally capital, except for petty 
offences punishable locally or by magistrates. Imprisonment was 
conceived of purely as a system of safe custody on remand before 
trial. It is said that the idea of imprisonment as a form of sen­
tence was borrowed from the law of the Church, which confined 
offenders in some place of retreat in order that they might quietly 
consider their sins and have time to repent. As capital punish­
ment declined, its place was for a long time taken by transportation
20 Ibid., p. 367.
21 Ibid., p. 371.
22 Ibid., p. 361.
23 Omission of the “allocutus" is no serious error in procedure: The 
Canadian Criminal Code (1953-4), 2 4  3 Eliz. II, c. 51, s. 575 is 
similar.
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of convicts to the colonies. When this practice was discontinued 
the law was left, at a relatively late date, to find another substitute, 
and the rather unimaginative and ineffective prison sentence was 
the result. When we add to this the mechanical, mathematical 
approach to sentences, measuring out punishments in doses of 
more or less years, we cannot fail to see how badly this part of 
the law compares with many of its happier and more convincing 
sections.
Passing to the field of tort, an interesting and often neglected 
phenomenon is the transformation of items of damage in one 
action into independent forms of action, e.g., the tort of intimida­
tion out of special damages in trespass to land for intimidation 
of the occupier’s servants or tenants.-4 And an element of a tort 
might become a tort, e.g., the hostile attitude or “insult” which 
made a battery tortious was turned into an independent tort of 
assault.23 We know today how the element of “negligence” in 
various torts has become a tort of negligence in itself, and how 
the submission of conduct to the test of the view of the “reason­
able man”, probably originally due to the incompetence of the 
defendant to testify as to his real state of mind, has become an 
avenue of broad judicial legislation.20
The law of defamation has undergone curious changes in 
content, which may account for its somewhat unsatisfactory 
nature. An old writ lay at common law where several persons 
conspired to indict a third person for a crime of which they knew 
he was innocent.27 Out of this writ two variant writs developed, 
one against a single person for procuring an indictment (the tort 
of malicious prosecution)28, and the other for false accusation of 
an indictable crime, whether or not prosecution followed.20 In the 
background lay a statute which prohibited the ecclesiastical courts 
from punishing persons who promoted the prosecution of crimi­
nals, even if the accusations were unjust.30 Early defamation cases 
concerned oral slander which imputed a crime, generally theft. 
Yet modern defamation is generally in writing and covers an 
immense range of imputations, that of direct theft being today fairly 
uncommon. Because imputations of crime required no proof of 
special damage and this rule was extended to all cases of written
24 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., p. 444.
25 Ibid., p. 381.
26 Ibid., pp. 390, 440.
27 Kiralfy, Action on the Case, pp. 117, 122.
28 Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 406.
29 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., p. 434.
30 (1326-7), 1 Edw. Ill, st. 2, c. 11.
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defamation, English law never developed any consistent theory 
of damages in libel, and awards differ extraordinarily and dis­
turbingly.31
In the field of commercial law a notable development has 
occurred with respect to bills of exchange and bills of lading. 
Originating as evidences of transactions these took on proprietary 
characteristics. Bills of exchange first became popular to avoid 
the risk of loss or theft of money, but they came to be a common 
method of extending commercial credit, relapsing into relative 
unimportance in recent years as other financing methods 
developed, and completing a full circle in the popularity of the 
cheque, itself desirable because it avoids the need to carry large 
sums of money.32
The law of contract is marked by several cases of adaptation. 
It appears clear to me that Lord Mansfield had considerable insight 
into the real springs of our law of contract, when he considered 
that seals and consideration were matters of evidence. Research 
tends to show that this was originally true. Early records of the 
sealing of contracts refer to this procedure as providing testimony 
and not as a formal ceremonial.33 The growth of literacy passed 
unnoticed by the law, and seals continued to be demanded long 
after they had become antiquated in every-day life. Though the 
legal requirements could be satisfied by the mere letters “L.S.” 
or by indentations or creases.34 In favour of the view that con­
sideration was also evidentiary is the fact that it first appeared in 
connection with certain tortious claims for negligence and that 
consideration has quite disappeared in this field in modern times.35 
That the lawyers of the great creative age of simple contract were 
confused as to the principle, if any, underlying consideration, 
appears from their readiness to follow any false god, be he cause, 
benefit or damage, according to the vogue of the moment, or to 
combine all these ideas in their pleadings.30 Even Pinnel’s case, 
the great authority on consideration, was a debt action and not an 
assumpsit action, and can be explained in terms of the peculiar
31 A good solution is The Libel Act and Slander Act of Ontario (1958),
6 & 7 Eliz. II, c. 51, s. 5 (2 ) which limits claims against newspapers 
or broadcasters to actual damage.
32 Holden, History of Negotiable Instruments.
33 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, vol. 2, p. 220, n. 1; 
Kiralfy, Source Book, p. 180; Potter, Historical Introduction to English 
Law, 4th ed., pp. 457, 478.
34 Cf., Cheshire & Fifoot, The Law of Contract, 5th ed., p. 19.
35 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., pp. 473, 476, 
478.
36 Ibid., pp. 474, 475.
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common law conception of the solidarity of a debt, without 
resorting to the doctrine of consideration at all, e.g., if a debt of 
£50 was claimed and £49 was proved to be owing the plaintiff- 
creditor at one time lost his claim!47
Deceit is an idea which has been put to varying uses. We 
first find it used for certain abuses of litigation, like impersonation 
in legal proceedings. It is then used as a “bridge” by which to 
make mere failure to perform a contract actionable, treating it 
as a positive wrong and providing an alternative explanation 
to “breach of an informal covenant”. Having provided a pretext 
for the enforcement of simple contracts, it is dropped from con­
tractual pleadings and emerges as a modern tort based on repre­
sentations of fact and not intention! I say nothing of the rami­
fications of the further refinement, equitable (or inequitable?) 
fraud!58
The law of persons bristles with examples of changes in the 
function of institutions. One example is the extension of the age 
of 21, the age at which a man could attain knighthood, to majority 
in all sorts of situations, whereas originally full age was attained 
at various ages for various purposes.39 The fatal attraction of 
aristocratic privilege accounts for another very typical feature of 
the old common law, the principle of primogeniture, which gave 
all lands on intestacy to the eldest son of the last owner.40 There 
may have been an economic justification for this rule in early 
feudal times for the aristocracy, but its extension to all forms of 
land tenure is less convincing, granted that the fragmentation of 
farms is undesirable.
Marriage in more pious times than our own could be con­
stituted by mere cohabitation with marital intent, and the religious 
ceremony was merely proof. Yet, in the teeth of scholarly oppo­
sition, modem courts have held a religious ceremony or a statu­
tory substitute, essential and the “common law marriage” has 
practically disappeared everywhere.41
The wide powers of a husband over his wife’s property were 
typical of the classic common law approach until the 19th century 
reforms, yet legal history shows that he gained his powers over
37 Ibid., p. 480.
38 Ibid., pp. 428, 463, 465.
39 Ibid., p. 639.
40 Ibid., p. 557.
41 Ibid., p. 219; the law is now statutory: In England see The Marriage
Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. VI, c. 76; in Ontario, see R.S.O., 1960,
c. 228.
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her land as an extension of purely administrative powers, and 6ver 
her goods as a result of a confusion as to the relative spherej of 
royal and church courts.42 The important law of guardianship 
began as a protection for the guardian and gradually changed into 
a protection for a ward.43
The legal profession itself has changed its functions con­
siderably. The “attorney” was at first a local agent who could 
save his client trips to the courthouse, and whose main feature 
was an ability to make binding admissions or stipulations or 
approve final pleas in his name. The barrister was an eloquent 
and amateur friend who undertook to plead for a less articulate 
litigant. Yet as early as the end of the 13th century the two 
branches of the legal profession had assumed a professional 
character, with specialized training, and with strict admission 
controlled by the judicial bench. The Englishman may well 
regard these two professions as inherently distinct, but in North 
America they have tended to fuse, so that the same man may 
belong to both, without, however, quite destroying the division 
into advocates and office lawyers, as a matter of pure practice.
In conclusion we might mention the Parliamentary bill. This 
was first formulated by a subject with a grievance, and pressed 
upon the attention of the Crown. Then formal bills were drawn 
up in the same way. Today almost all legislation proceeds from 
the Crown and is drafted by permanent staffs employed for the 
purpose.
It is difficult to draw any universal conclusions from a study 
which has ranged over so many areas over so many centuries. 
The explanation for the evergreen character of various legal insti­
tutions may lie in the caution of the judges, the desire to appear 
to be dealing with the familiar and commonplace, and also, in 
part, in a genuine gradual change in the understanding of some 
institution. My own predilection is for the first of these two alter­
natives. I feel that lawyers and judges have been at all times 
acutely aware of the needs of the moment and of the serious 
limitations on what was possible under the law. They have been 
quick to grasp the opportunity to remould existing institutions 
to achieve new purposes. Indeed they may well have felt that 
these institutions, e.g., deceit, wardship, breach of the peace, 
venue, were in some Platonic sense inevitable, as the Roman 
lawyer struggles to fit new types of business arrangements into the
42 Holdsworth. History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 526.
43 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 4th ed., p. 640.
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“ numerus clausus” of the classical Roman contracts. At the same 
time they have never felt their incidents to be sacrosanct, and have 
taken the most remarkable liberties with their substance.
Be this as it may, I hope that I have established that, along­
side the avowed work of legislative law reform, a great body of 
reform has been achieved by the courts, often with laudable con­
scientiousness and always with becoming modesty.
